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ABSTRACT. In economic decisions we often have to deal with uncertain events for which 
no probabilities are known.  Several normative models have been proposed for such 
decisions.  Empirical studies have usually been qualitative, or they estimated ambiguity 
aversion through one single number.  This paper introduces the source method, a 
tractable method for quantitatively analyzing uncertainty empirically that can capture the 
richness of ambiguity attitudes.  The theoretical key in our method is the distinction 
between different sources of uncertainty, within which subjective (choice-based) 
probabilities can still be defined.  Source functions convert those subjective probabilities 
into willingness to bet.  We apply our method in an experiment, where we do not commit 
to particular ambiguity attitudes but let the data speak. 
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An individual … can always assign relative likelihoods to the states of nature.  
But how does he act in the presence of uncertainty?  The answer to that may 
depend on another judgment, about the reliability, credibility, or adequacy of 
his information. 
Daniel Ellsberg (1961, p. 659) 
 In many situations we do not know the probabilities of uncertain events that are 
relevant for the outcomes of our decisions.  The importance of finding tools to 
analyze such situations has been understood since Frank Knight (1921).  In some 
situations we can still assign subjective probabilities to the relevant events and use 
expected utility (Leonard Savage 1954) or, more generally, nonexpected utility 
(“probabilistic sophistication;” Mark Machina and David Schmeidler 1992).  In a 
fundamental contribution, Ellsberg (1961) showed that it is often impossible to use 
subjective probabilities, implying that probabilistic sophistication cannot be applied.  
We therefore have to develop more general models (“ambiguity”).  Whereas the 
importance of developing such models had been understood for a long time, it was not 
until the end of the 1980’s that such models were discovered (multiple priors: Itzhak 
Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; rank dependent utility: Gilboa 1987, Schmeidler 1989). 
 Ambiguity has subsequently become a central topic of research, and several new 
models have been developed (David Ahn, Syngjoo Choi, Douglas Gale, and Shachar 
Kariv 2009; Gilboa 2004), most of which were normatively oriented.  They usually 
assumed expected utility for given probabilities (Gilboa and Schmeidler 1989; Peter 
Klibanoff, Massimo Marinacci, and Sujoy Mukerji 2005; Fabio Maccheroni, 
Marinacci, and Aldo Rustichini 2006; Schmeidler 1989).  Our aim, however, is purely 
descriptive.  Hence, we assume nonexpected utility throughout. 
 Several recent empirical studies compared ambiguous events with unambiguous 
events as in Ellsberg’s (1961) paradox, and fitted the α-maxmin model (Yan Chen, 
Peter Katušcák, and Emre Ozdenoren 2007; see also Ahn et al. 2009; for a survey of 
neuro-studies, see Soo Hong Chew, King King Li, Robin Chark, and Songfa Zhong 
2008).  The ambiguity attitude of an individual was then captured by one number, the 
α parameter, taken as a general degree of ambiguity aversion.  Our paper considers 
richer domains of uncertainty with various events and various levels of likelihood 
involved, both for experimental Ellsberg-type events and for natural events.  The data 
that we obtain reveal rich patterns of ambiguity attitudes.  Besides aversion, 
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insensitivity to ambiguity turns out also to be an important component.  Further, 
within one individual, the two components vary widely between different sources of 
uncertainty.  Hence it is desirable to develop flexible and rich tools to analyze 
ambiguity, and this is the purpose of the present paper.  The richness of ambiguity, 
with no probabilities of events specified, can be compared to the richness of outcomes 
with no monetary values specified.  In the same way as one cannot expect there to be 
one index of risk aversion applicable to all nonmonetary outcomes, one cannot expect 
there to be one index of ambiguity aversion applicable to all ambiguous events.  We 
show that, despite its richness, ambiguity can be quantitatively analyzed in a tractable 
manner by means of what we call the source method.  We can make exact quantitative 
predictions about future behavior and we can calculate ambiguity premiums.   
 A central concept in our analysis will concern sources of uncertainty, as first 
advanced by Amos Tversky in the early 1990s (Tversky and Craig Fox 1995; Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman 1992).  Sources of uncertainty are groups of events that are 
generated by the same mechanism of uncertainty, which implies that they have similar 
characteristics.  Following Chew and Jacob Sagi (2008), we can define choice-based 
probabilities within particular (uniform) sources even when Machina and 
Schmeidler’s (1992) probabilistic sophistication does not hold between sources.  
Source functions then map choice-based probabilities into willingness to bet.  In this 
way, the richness of attitudes to uncertainty and ambiguity can be captured by graphs 
on the probability interval rather than by general functions on algebras of events.  
This considerably increases the tractability of the analysis.   
 To sum up, we use three components to describe decision under uncertainty: (a) 
the utility of outcomes; (b) choice-based probabilities for each source of uncertainty; 
(c) source functions.  Component (c) captures the deviations from Bayesianism2 in a 
tractable manner.  Those deviations include the Allais and Ellsberg paradoxes, the 
home bias, and ambiguity aversion.  Attitudes towards ambiguity are measured by 
comparing component (c) for known and unknown probabilities.  In the Bayesian 
view, (a) reflects tastes, (b) reflects beliefs, and (c) reflects deviations from rational 
behavior. 
 The paper proceeds as follows.  §I presents preliminaries, including the decision 
model assumed.  Our model includes most nonexpected utility models used today.  
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§II.A introduces the source method, with ways to model different attitudes towards 
uncertainty and ambiguity in §II.B.  §II.C presents indexes of aversion to uncertainty 
and of insensitivity to uncertainty.  §III tests our new concepts in the often-studied 
Ellsberg paradox, and §IV tests them for natural uncertainties from daily life.  In both 
cases, a rich variety of ambiguity attitudes is found, not only between persons, but 
also within them.  The patterns found confirm, for revealed-preference data, findings 
in the psychological literature that were based on introspective judgments (Tversky 
and Fox 1995; Hillel Einhorn and Robin Hogarth 1985).  §V contains a discussion 
and §VI concludes.  A Web Appendix gives experimental details, in particular 
discussing the incentives used.  It further gives all parameter estimations at the 
individual level, all details of statistical tests discussed later, and several other results 
at the individual level.  Examples A.1 and A.2 in this appendix illustrate how our 
method can give exact quantitative predictions for the home bias (Kenneth French and 
James Poterba 1991).  The home bias entails that investors systematically prefer 
domestic stocks to foreign stocks beyond beliefs (subjective probabilities) or tastes 
(utilities).  The bias is accommodated by the different source functions for the 
different stocks. 
I. Preliminaries 
 This section introduces basic concepts and notation.  (E1:x1,…,En:xn) denotes a 
prospect yielding outcome xj if event Ej happens.  Outcomes are nonnegative real 
numbers designating money.  Exactly one of the events E1, …, En will happen and it 
is uncertain which one.  Thus it is uncertain which outcome will result from a chosen 
prospect.  í denotes the preference relation of a decision maker over the prospects.  
We assume weak ordering throughout; i.e., í is complete and transitive.  Strict 
preference (ê) and indifference or equivalence (~) are defined as usual.  For each 
prospect, the certainty equivalent is the sure amount that is indifferent to the prospect.  
Expected utility holds if a prospect (E1:x1,…,En:xn) is evaluated by its expected utility 
∑j=1
n  
P(Ej)u(xj), with u, the utility function, continuous and strictly increasing and P(Ej) 
the subjective probability of event Ej. 
 In our measurements we will need only two-outcome prospects.  The notation xEy 
is shorthand for (E:x, not-E:y).  It is implicitly assumed in this notation that x ≥ y.  
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For such binary prospects, most static and transitive nonexpected utility theories3 use 
the same evaluation.  Since these theories diverge only for prospects with three or 
more outcomes, the results of this paper apply to all of them.  This convenient feature 
of binary prospects was put forward by Ghirardato and Marinacci (2001), Duncan 
Luce (1991), and John Miyamoto (1988).   
 We first define our basic model for uncertainty, where no probabilities need to be 
given.  A weighting function W assigns a number W(E) between 0 and 1 to each event 
E, such that: 
(i) W(∅) = 0; 
(ii) W is 1 at the universal event; 
(iii) E ⊃ F  implies  W(E) ≥ W(F). 
Binary rank-dependent utility (RDU) holds for binary prospects if there exist a strictly 
increasing utility function u : — → —, and a weighting function W such that 
preferences maximize 
 xEy  #  W(E)u(x) + (1 − W(E))u(y). (1) 
This model generalizes expected utility by allowing W to be nonadditive.  W can be 
interpreted as willingness to bet. 
 For calibrations of likelihoods of events, we fix a “good” and a “bad” outcome.  
Let us assume that these are 1000 and 0, the values used in the second experiment 
reported later.  A bet on event E designates the prospect 1000E0.  E and F are revealed 
equally likely, denoted E ~ F, if 1000E0 ~ 1000F0.  We next define an exchangeability 
condition that is stronger than revealed equal likelihood. 
 
DEFINITION 1.  Two disjoint events E1 and E2 are exchangeable if exchanging the 
outcomes under the events E1 and E2 never affects the preference for a prospect; i.e., 
always (E1:x1,E2:x2, …,En:xn) ~ (E1:x2,E2:x1,…,En:xn).  A partition (E1,…,En) is 
exchangeable if all of its elements are mutually exchangeable.  · 
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 See Ahn et al. (2009), Choi, Raymond Fisman, et al. (2007), Thibault Gajdos, Takashi Hayashi, Jean-
Marc Tallon, and Jean-Christophe Vergnaud (2008), Gilboa (1987), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), 
Paolo Ghirardato, Maccheroni, & Marinacci (2004), Schmeidler (1989), and Tversky and Kahneman 
(1992). 
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Exchangeability of events implies that they are equally likely.  Exchangeable 
partitions were called uniform by Savage (1954), and they played a central role in his 
analysis.  We will use Savage’s term uniform for a slightly different and more general 
concept, for which the following definition prepares. 
 Probabilistic sophistication holds if there exists a probability measure P such that 
for each prospect (E1:x1,…,En:xn) the only relevant aspect for its preference is the 
probability distribution (p1:x1,…,pn:xn) that it generates over the outcomes, where pj = 
P(Ej) for all j.  That is, two different prospects that generate the same probability 
distribution over outcomes are equivalent in terms of í.  Probabilistic sophistication 
maintains the probability measure P from expected utility but allows for more general 
(nonexpected-utility) evaluations over probability distributions.  Under probabilistic 
sophistication, revealed equal likelihood is not only necessary, but also sufficient for 
exchangeability.  The special case of known objective probabilities (risk) will be 
discussed after we have introduced sources in the next section. 
II. Sources of Uncertainty 
 The first step in our analysis is to distinguish between different sources of 
uncertainty.  A source of uncertainty concerns a group of events that is generated by a 
common mechanism of uncertainty.  In Ellsberg’s (1961) classical two-color paradox, 
one source of uncertainty concerns the color of a ball drawn randomly from an urn 
containing 50 black balls and 50 red ones (the known urn).  Another source concerns 
the color of a ball drawn randomly from an urn with 100 black and red balls in 
unknown proportion (the unknown urn).  People are willing to exchange a bet on 
black for a bet on red from the known urn, with similar willingness to exchange colors 
for the unknown urn.  They are, however, not willing to exchange a bet on a color 
from the known urn for a bet on a color from the unknown urn.  This willingness to 
exchange within but not between urns suggests that the events pertaining to the same 
urn share features and constitute one source of uncertainty, but events concerning 
different urns belong to different sources.  The Ellsberg paradox concerns one special 
case of the different treatment of different sources (Chew et al. 2008; Tversky and 
Fox 1995).  Alternatively, one source of uncertainty can concern the Dow Jones 
index, and another source the Nikkei index, as in the home bias.  Whereas 
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probabilistic sophistication is usually violated between sources, as first demonstrated 
by the Ellsberg paradoxes, within single sources it is often still satisfied. 
A. Uniform Sources 
 For convenience, we will assume that sources are algebras, which means that 
they contain the universal event (certain to happen), the vacuous event (certain not to 
happen), the complement of each of their elements, and the union of each pair of their 
elements.  Thus they also contain every finite union and intersection of their elements.  
Extensions to domains other than algebras are left to future studies. 
 We call a source S uniform if probabilistic sophistication holds with respect to S.  
Formally, this means that there exists a probability measure P on the events of S such 
that the preference for each prospect (E1:x1,…,En:xn) with all outcome-relevant events 
Ej in S depends only on: (a) the source S; (b) the probability distribution 
(p1:x1,…,pn:xn) generated over outcomes, with pj the probability P(Ej).  Under 
uniformity, P will usually denote the relevant probability measure on the source 
without further mention.  Uniformity is an endogenous concept.  Chew and Sagi 
(2008) emphasized the interest of considering probabilistic sophistication within 
sources without imposing it between sources.  Wakker (2008) pointed out that 
probabilistic sophistication within a source entails a uniform degree of ambiguity for 
that source, which is why we call such sources uniform. 
 If a finite partition (E1,…,En) is exchangeable then the generated source 
(consisting of unions of events from that partition) is uniform.  Chew and Sagi (2006) 
showed that, under some regularity and richness conditions4, a source is uniform if 
and only if the following conditions hold for the events of the source: 
  E ~ F (E and F are revealed equally likely) implies that 
  E and F are exchangeable (holds for all uniform partitions). (2) 
 For each pair of disjoint events, one contains a subset that  
  is exchangeable with the other (imposing richness). (3) 
                                               
4
 Their richness is satisfied under the common assumption that the probability measure is atomless and 
countably additive on a sigma algebra.  It can also be accommodated for finite equally-likely-state 
spaces as in our Section III (Eq. 4 can then be dropped). 
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  For each n there exists an exchangeable n-fold partition (imposing richness). (4) 
This result shows that uniformity is a natural extension of exchangeability from finite 
sources to rich (continuum) structures. 
 For a rich uniform source, we can elicit probabilities to any desired degree of 
precision using a bisection method and Eq. 3 (see §IV.A).  We can, for example, 
partition the universal event into two equally likely events E11 and E
1
2 that then must 
each have probability 0.5.  We next partition E11 into two equally likely events E
2
1 and 
E22 that must each have probability ¼, and we partition E
1
2 into two equally likely 
events E23 and E
2
4 that also each have probability ¼.  We continue likewise.  This 
method will also be used in the experiments described later.  We will then test some 
implications of the Eqs. 2-4, similar to Baillon (2008). 
 We next consider an implication of probabilistic sophistication (with probability 
measure P) on S that will be useful for the analysis of ambiguity for uniform sources 
in the next subsection.  Under probabilistic sophistication on S, there exists a function 
wS such that for any event E from S we have5 
 W(E) = wS(P(E)) . (5) 
After substitution in Eq. 1, we obtain the following evaluation of binary prospects: 
 xEy  #  wS(P(E))u(x) + (1 − wS(P(E)))u(y). (6) 
The function wS, carrying subjective probabilities to decision weights, is called the 
source function.  Probabilistic sophistication on S generalizes the probabilistic 
sophistication of Machina and Schmeidler (1992) because wS can now depend on the 
source.  That is, whereas probabilistic sophistication holds within some sources, it 
need not hold between sources.  The source method uses source functions to analyze 
uncertainty. 
 Vernon Smith (1969, p. 325) and Robert Winkler (1991, giving several more 
references) argued for maintaining probabilistic beliefs in the Ellsberg paradox.  They 
                                               
5
 The implication can be derived as follows.  If P(A) = P(B), then 1000A0 ~ 1000B0.  Substituting Eq. 1 
shows that then W(A) = W(B).  Thus, equality of P implies equality of W.  It is well known that Eq. 5 
then follows. 
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preferred to accommodate this paradox using the utility function.  We will maintain 
probabilities but will also leave utility unaffected (the latter was argued for by 
Hogarth and Einhorn 1990, p. 708).  Instead, we use source functions as the third 
component, rather than modifying probabilities (beliefs) or utilities (“tastes”), to 
capture ambiguity attitudes.  Source functions reflect interactions between beliefs and 
tastes that are typical of nonexpected utility and that are deemed irrational in the 
Bayesian normative approach. 
 Under usual regularity conditions, wS(0) = 0, wS(1) = 1, and wS is continuous and 
strictly increasing.  As is usual, we assume that events with known probabilities 
constitute one uniform source of uncertainty (Fox, Brett Rogers, and Tversky 1996, p. 
7), and we write the corresponding source function without subscript.  For an event E 
with known probability P(E) = p, we equate xEy with the probability distribution xpy, 
yielding x with probability p and y with probability 1−p.  The convention x ≥ y is 
maintained in this notation.  The evaluation is, accordingly: 
 xpy  #  w(p)u(x) + (1 − w(p))u(y). (7) 
We call probability distributions over outcomes risky prospects, or just prospects if no 
confusion will arise.  As for uncertainty, also for risk most nonexpected utility 
theories used today agree for binary prospects and evaluate them by Eq. 7. 
 
B. Uncertainty Attitudes  
 Figure 1 depicts the main properties of source functions wS (c.f. Hogarth and 
Einhorn 1990, Figure 1).  The x-axis designates probabilities p, which are choice-
based and need not be objective.  The y-axis designates weights wS(p), that is, 
transformed probabilities.  Fig. 1a displays expected utility with a linear source 
function.  Fig. 1b displays a convex source function, leading to low weights for good 
outcomes and enhancing risk aversion or pessimism.  Fig. 1c displays an inverse-S 
shaped source function wS.  The convex part near 1 explains the risk aversion and 
pessimism found for unfavorable events that happen with a small probability (so that 
the complementary, favorable, event E weighted by wS has a high probability).  The 
concave part near 0 explains the risk seeking and optimism found for favorable events 
E that happen with a small probability (the long shot effect).  Thus the inverse S-
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shape explains the coexistence of gambling and insurance (Tversky and Kahneman 
1992, p. 316). 
 The inverse-S shaped source functions reflect a lack of sensitivity to intermediate 
changes in likelihood, so that all intermediate likelihoods are moved in the direction 
of fifty-fifty. The jumps from certainty to uncertainty are then overweighted.  Hence, 
this phenomenon is also called likelihood insensitivity.  It suggests that decisions will 
not be influenced much by the updating of probabilities after receipt of new 
information.  Likelihood insensitivity resembles regression to the mean.  It is, 
however, not a statistical artifact, but a perceptual phenomenon that occurs in actual 
decisions.  Fig. 1d, the most common shape, combines the two deviations from 
expected utility, pessimism and likelihood insensitivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Comparative versions of the above concepts can be defined.  This can be done 
between persons (Mr. A is more averse to investing in Dutch stocks than Mr. W).  
Ellsberg’s paradox shows that such comparisons can also be done within persons (this 
person is more pessimistic about investing in foreign stocks than in domestic stocks; 
cf. Fox and Tversky 1995, p. 162).  Formal definitions and results are in Fox and 
Tversky (1998), Michael Kilka and Martin Weber (2001), Drazen Prelec (1998), 
FIGURE 1. Shapes of source functions 
FIGURE 1a. 
Expected uti-
lity: linearity 
wS(p) 
0 
1 
FIGURE 1b. 
Pessimism: 
convexity 
0 
FIGURE 1c. Li- 
kelihood insensi-
tivity: inverse-S 
0 
FIGURE 1d. 
Common 
finding 
1 
p 
1 1 
0 
1 1 
1 1 
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Tversky and Fox (1995), Tversky and Wakker (1995), and George Wu and Richard 
Gonzalez (1999). 
 Ambiguity reflects what uncertainty comprises beyond risk.  That is, it concerns 
the differences between decisions and beliefs for unknown probabilities versus those 
for known probabilities.  Ambiguity attitudes can be examined by comparing source 
functions for ambiguous sources to those for sources with known probabilities.  More 
general comparisons, between different sources that are all ambiguous, are possible 
(§IV). 
C. Indexes of Uncertainty Aversion and Insensitivity 
 The graphs of source functions capture attitudes towards uncertainty.  For reasons 
of parsimony, it is sometimes convenient to summarize ambiguity attitudes in terms 
of one index number, or two as we will propose.  Our proposed indexes are based on 
neo-additive weighting functions (Alain Chateauneuf, Jürgen Eichberger, and Simon 
Grant 2007).  It was suggested to us by Fox (1995, personal communication).  The 
first index summarizes the degree of pessimism, with optimism as its counterpart.  
This index of pessimism will be larger in Fig. 1b than in Fig. 1a.  The difference in 
pessimism between uncertainty and risk then reflects ambiguity aversion.  The data of 
our experiments show that a second kind of deviation from expected utility, 
orthogonal to pessimism, is relevant: the degree of likelihood insensitivity.  Fig. 1c 
exhibits more likelihood insensitivity than Fig. 1a.  We use linear regression, 
illustrated in Figure 2, to define the two indexes.  Choosing our indexes corresponds 
to choosing the neo-additive weighting function that best fits the data. 
 Assume that the regression line of the source function on the open interval (0,1) 
is p # c + sp, with c the intercept and s the slope.  Let d = 1 − c − s be the distance 
from 1 of the regression line at p = 1; i.e., the “dual intercept.”  We define 
 a = c + d (= 1 − s) as an index of likelihood insensitivity,  (8) 
and 
 b = d − c (= 1 − s − 2c) as an index of pessimism. (9)  
These indexes can be interpreted as simplified versions of indexes used by Kilka and 
Weber (2001) and Tversky and Fox (1995).  Craig Webb and Horts Zank (2008) 
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considered their measurement and preference axiomatizations.  An elaborate 
discussion and theoretical analysis of these measures, as well as of general properties 
and comparisons of source functions, are left to future research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III. The Source Method for Ellsberg-like Uncertainties 
 This section shows how source functions capture attitudes towards uncertainty 
and ambiguity for the classical two-color Ellsberg paradox.  This paradox concerns 
artificial events in a laboratory setup, but it is the most studied case of ambiguity, so 
that it serves well as a first test of new concepts. 
A. Experimental Design 
 N = 67 students faced two Ellsberg-like urns.  The known urn K contained eight 
balls of different colors: red, blue, yellow, black, green, purple, brown, cyan.  The 
unknown urn contained eight balls with the same eight colors but the composition was 
unknown in the sense that some colors might appear several times and others might be 
absent.  As explained in §II, the two urns concern two different sources.  For both 
urns, each ball was equally likely to be drawn.  In what follows, elementary events of 
a single color drawn are denoted (with S = K or S = U) by RS, BS, YS, AS (A for black), 
GS, PS, NS (N for brown), and CS.  Subjects faced twenty-six series of choice tasks.  
Each series involved a choice between a prospect and an ascending range of sure 
payments, with the midpoint between the switching values taken as indifference point.  
c = 
   0 
FIG.d. 
Insensitivity 
index a: 0.22; 
pessimism 
index b: 0.06. 
 
1 
d = 
0.14 
d = 
0.11 
d = 
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0.08 
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pessimism 
index b: 0. 
FIGURE 2. Quantitative indexes of pessimism and likelihood insensitivity 
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0.11 
 
FIG.c. 
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index a: 0.22; 
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index b: 0. 
0 
d = 
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wS(p) 
0 p 
1 1 
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At the beginning of the experiment, each subject was told that one of their choices 
would be randomly drawn and then played for real.   
B. Analysis 
 Testing Uniformity.  According to uniformity, certainty equivalents of the 
prospect 25E0 should be the same for different events E with an equal number of 
colors (exchangeability).  We tested this equality for the unknown urn for three one-
color events, randomly chosen per subject, for the two-color events {YU,AU}, 
{GU,PU}, {NU,CU}, and {RU,BU}, and for the four-color events {RU,BU,YU,AU} and 
{GU,PU,NU,CU}. 
 Elicitation of Utility.  Utility was elicited using the semi-parametric method of 
Abdellaoui, Han Bleichrodt and Olivier L’Haridon (2008).  For each urn we elicited 
certainty equivalents for seven prospects with outcomes between 0 and 25, and the 
outcome-relevant event always being {RS,BS,YS,KS,}, with S = K or S = U.  This event 
has a subjective probability of 0.5 for both S.  We fitted Eq. 7 assuming a power 
utility function u(x) = ( x25)
rS
 (S = K or S = U), and taking the weight wS(0.5) of the 
outcome-relevant event as extra parameter.  We used nonlinear least-square 
estimation with the certainty equivalent as dependent variable.  Choi et al. (2007) 
used a similar model with power utility and the same distance measure to fit multiple-
choice data. 
 Source Functions.  To measure wS(p) for p ≠ 0.5, we elicited certainty 
equivalents CE of prospects 25E0 with E containing j colors for all j ≠ 4.  Substituting 
Eq. 7 then gives wS(j/8) = (CE/25)rS as a nonparametric estimation.  Once the values 
wS(j/8) have been elicited, we can do parametric fitting using Prelec’s (1998) two-
parametric compound invariance family while minimizing quadratic distance: 
 wS(p)  =  (exp(−(−ln(p))α))β.  (10) 
 Parameter α has a meaning similar to our index a reflecting insensitivity, and 
parameter β has a meaning similar to our index b reflecting pessimism.  The statistical 
tests of α and β gave results similar to those for a and b.  For brevity, we report only 
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the latter.6  We also analyzed our data using probabilistic choice-error theories and 
econometric maximum likelihood estimations.  The results are in the Web Appendix, 
and they all agree with the results reported here.  All estimations of utilities and 
weighting functions were done at the individual level. 
C. Results 
 Unless stated otherwise, all statistical tests concern two-sided t-tests with 0.05 as 
level of significance. 
 
Uniformity.  ANOVAs with repeated measures show that uniformity is not rejected (p 
= 0.335 for the single-color events; p = 0.245 for the two-color events; p = 0.824 for 
the four-color events).  Hence, we will assume the uniform subjective probability 
distribution.  Because of the central role of this assumption in our analysis, we 
inspected it also at the individual level, rejecting it only for subject 52, who was 
accordingly removed from the analysis.  No conclusion was affected by this removal. 
 
Utility.  The median utility parameters (rK = 1.05 and rU = 1.09) are not significantly 
different from 1 for both urns (sign-tests7; p = 0.539 for K; p = 0.175 for U).  Utility is 
the same for the two urns (sign-test; p = 0.902).   
 
Source Functions.  Figure 3 represents the source functions in the two urns (based on 
median parameters of the Prelec family).  The difference between the two curves 
reflects ambiguity attitudes.  The dashed curve, reflecting a general uncertainty 
attitude towards the unknown urn, then consists of the risk attitude component plus 
the ambiguity attitude component. 
 The source functions are significantly different from the identity function (wS(p) 
= p) at p = 1/8, 2/8, and 3/8 for urn K, and at p = 1/8, 5/8, 6/8 and 7/8 for urn U.  
Consequently, EU cannot accommodate our data, in agreement with common findings 
                                               
6
 The parameters a and b have clearer interpretations, primarily because α impacts both likelihood 
sensitivity and pessimism.  Indeed, α and β were more strongly correlated than a and b, here and also 
in the natural experiment reported later. 
7
 The parameters had outliers and were skewed, resulting in medians and sign tests (having more 
power) being more appropriate than means and t-tests. 
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(Gilboa 2004).  For large probabilities (p > 0.5), source functions are significantly 
lower for urn U than for urn K.  For small probabilities (p ≤ 0.5) there is no significant 
difference.   
 The likelihood insensitivity indexes (0.19 for K and 0.31 for U) significantly 
exceed 0. There is also significantly more insensitivity in urn U than in urn K, which 
is natural given that U has unknown probabilities whereas K has known probabilities.  
The pessimism index is positive in urn U (0.04) and negative (meaning optimism) in 
urn K (−0.08).  None of them are significantly different from 0.  Pessimism in the 
unknown urn, however, significantly exceeds that in the known urn.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 3. Median source functions in K and in U 
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TABLE 1.  Source functions for K and U 
p  Median Mean Interquartile 
range 
t-tests 
wS(p) = p 
t-tests 
wU = wK 
K 0.19 0.26 [0.12, 0.37] 0.000 1/8 
U 0.19 0.23 [0.06, 0.32] 0.000 
0.339 
K 0.31 0.34 [0.22, 0.44] 0.001 2/8 
U 0.27 0.30 [0.11, 0.45] 0.068 
0.231 
K 0.44 0.44 [0.30, 0.57] 0.012 3/8 
U 0.40 0.40 [0.22, 0.58] 0.294 
0.187 
K 0.50 0.50 [0.36, 0.63] 0.851 4/8 
U 0.48 0.46 [0.34, 0.56] 0.145 
0.066 
K 0.64 0.63 [0.50, 0.79] 0.849 5/8 
U 0.58 0.56 [0.42, 0.68] 0.023 
0.007 
K 0.75 0.73 [0.63, 0.86] 0.409 6/8 
U 0.68 0.65 [0.51, 0.81] 0.000 
0.001 
K 0.94 0.87 [0.80, 0.99] 0.911 7/8 
U 0.82 0.75 [0.63, 0.93] 0.000 
0.000 
The median value of wK(1/8) is 0.19, the mean value of wU(4/8) = 0.46, and so on. 
 
Individual Behavior.  There is much variation between subjects.  The following figure 
shows the source functions of three subjects.  The values corresponding to 
observations are represented by black (K) and white (U) circles, and the fitted source 
functions by a continuous line for K and a dash-dot line for U.   
 
 FIGURE 4. Individual Results 
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  (a) Subject 2   (b) Subject 44   (c) Subject 66 
 
 For urn K, subject 2 is mostly pessimistic, subject 44 is likelihood insensitive, 
and subject 66 combines both.  Subject 44 is ambiguity averse, subject 66 is 
ambiguity seeking, and subject 2 is more likelihood insensitive for urn U than for urn 
K.  The Web Appendix gives the graphs for 6 more individuals, discussing several 
p 
w(p) 
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other phenomena.  It also provides histograms of the shapes of individual source 
functions and of the number of subjects who are ambiguity averse or ambiguity 
seeking, plus some scatter plots explained later. 
D. Conclusions from the Ellsberg Experiment 
 Given the symmetry of the colors, it is not surprising that uniformity of the 
sources was verified because the events were exchangeable.  Our finding that 
different sources of uncertainty generate different source functions but not different 
utility functions is plausible.  The source functions directly pertain to uncertainty 
whereas the utility functions concern something of a different nature, being the value 
of outcomes.  This is corroborated by Abdellaoui, L'Haridon, and Paraschiv (2009) 
who also measured utility for risk and ambiguity within binary RDU and also found 
no difference. 
 The source functions display natural properties.  They deviate from EU 
(linearity).  There is more willingness to bet for risk than for ambiguity if the choice-
based probabilities on the x-axis exceed 0.5, as predicted both by greater aversion to 
uncertainty than to risk, and by greater insensitivity to uncertainty than to risk.  
Willingness to bet is the same for risk and for uncertainty if the choice-based 
probabilities are below 0.5.  This also agrees with both more aversion to, and more 
insensitivity to ambiguity, because these effects neutralize each other for such 
probabilities.   
 Whereas general ambiguity aversion would predict that all curves for the 
unknown urn are below those for the known urn, Figures 3 and 4 display more 
complex patterns.  There is also some ambiguity seeking, and considerable 
insensitivity to ambiguity displayed by inverse-S shaped curves.  These findings 
illustrate the richness of the domain of uncertainty. 
IV. The Source Method for Natural Uncertainties 
 Ellsberg’s urns were constructed such that uniformity is automatically satisfied 
within the sources.  Uniformity is less trivial for natural sources of uncertainty.  Such 
sources are the topic of the second experiment, presented in this section. 
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A. Experimental Design 
Subjects and stimuli (sources).  N = 62 students were presented prospects for three 
sources of uncertainty with unknown probabilities concerning: (a) The French Stock 
Index (CAC40) (how much it would change on a given day); (b) the temperature in 
Paris; (c) the temperature in a randomly drawn remote country, different for each 
subject.  All events concerned a fixed day (May 31, 2006) about three months after 
the experiment.  All indifferences were obtained using repeated choice and bisection. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stimuli: exchangeable events. Figure 5 depicts the partitioning of events that we used.  
This design for testing exchangeability was first used by Baillon (2008).  We elicited 
values a1/8, a1/4, a1/2, a3/4, a7/8 using indifferences between (bets on) events that 
partition events into two equally likely subevents, in the following order of elicitation: 
(a) (−∞, a1/2] ~ (a1/2, ∞) generating the exchangeable partition {E12, E22} at the second 
level in the figure; (b) (−∞, a1/4] ~ (a1/4, a1/2] and (a1/2, a3/4] ~ (a3/4, ∞) generating the 
exchangeable partition {E14, E24, E34, E44} at the third level in the figure; (c) (−∞, a1/8] ~ 
(a1/8, a1/4], and (a3/4, a7/8] ~ (a7/8, ∞) generating part of the exchangeable partition at the 
fourth level.  To illustrate our measurement, if a subject preferred to bet on (= 
receiving 1000 conditional on) event (l, ∞) rather than on event (−∞, l), but preferred 
to bet on (−∞, h) rather than on (h, ∞), then we inferred that a1/2 was between l < h.  A 
subsequent preference for betting on  (−∞, (h + l)/2) rather than on ((h + l)/2, ∞) then 
shows that a1/2 is actually between l and (h + l)/2; and so on.  Next, with a1/2 elicited, 
a preference for betting on (l´, a1/2) rather than on (−∞, l´) then shows that a1/4 is 
between l´ and a1/2.  And  so on. 
E58 E
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FIGURE 5. Decomposition of the universal event 
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The italicized numbers and events in the bottom row were not elicited. 
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 In the notation Eij  =  (a(i−1)/j, ai/j], subscript j indicates the level (number of events 
in the partition), and superscript i indicates the number of the event in a left-to-right 
reading.  Thus events E2i−12j  and E
2i
2j  partition event E
i
j.  In the notation ai/j, the subscript 
i/j designates the probability of not exceeding ai/j under uniformity.  We did not 
measure a3/8 and a5/8 so as to reduce the burden of the subjects, and because the 
literature on risk and uncertainty suggests that the most interesting phenomena occur 
at extreme values.  In other words, we did not determine the middle events of the 
exchangeable partition {E18, …,E88}.  Using the values measured, we carried out 
several tests of uniformity (= exchangeability for our stimuli). 
 
Stimuli; certainty equivalents.  We measured certainty equivalents of the risky 
prospects 10001/80, 10001/40, 10001/20, 10003/40, and 10007/80, and of the risky fifty-
fifty prospects 5001/20, 10001/2500, 5001/2250, 7501/2500, and 10001/2750. We also 
measured the certainty equivalents of the prospect 1000E0, with E being (−∞, a1/8], 
(−∞, a1/4], (−∞, a1/2], (−∞, a3/4], (−∞, a7/8], and (a1/2, ∞) for each source.   
 
Motivating subjects.  All subjects received a flat payment of 20.  For the hypothetical 
treatment (n = 31), all choices were hypothetical.  For the real treatment (n = 31), real 
incentives were implemented by the random incentive system in addition to the flat 
payment.  That is, one of the 31 subjects was randomly selected at the end, and one of 
his choices was randomly selected to be played for real.  The money earned could be 
collected about three months later, after the uncertainty had been resolved.  The 
subjects in the hypothetical treatment did not know that a real-incentive treatment 
would follow later for other subjects. 
 
Analysis.  Unless stated otherwise, all statistical tests concern two-sided t-tests with 
0.05 as level of significance.  We fitted the data similarly as in the first experiment.  
We first used the certainty equivalents of the (risky) fifty-fifty prospects 5001/20, 
10001/2500, 5001/2250, 7501/2500, and 10001/2750, respectively, to optimally fit Eq. 7 
with power utility u(x) = xρ.  With the utility function thus determined, we used the 
certainty equivalents of the prospects 10001/80, 10001/40, 10001/20, 10003/40, 10007/80 
to determine the source function w(p) for risk at the probabilities concerned.  Then, by 
Eq. 7, CE ~ 1000p0 implies w(p) = CEρ/1000ρ for all p = 1/8, 1/4, 1/2, 3/4, and 7/8. 
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 Because the first experiment found no difference in utility between risk and 
uncertainty, and because there is no prior reason to expect such a difference, we only 
measured utility for risk in the second experiment and used that utility for uncertainty 
too.  Thus we did not have to measure utility for uncertainty separately and were able 
to reduce the burden for the subjects.  For each uncertain source, we used the certainty 
equivalents of bets on the events (−∞, a1/8], (−∞, a1/4], (−∞, a1/2], (−∞, a3/4], and (−∞, 
a7/8], and the power utility function to determine the W values of these events, with 
CE ~ 1000E0 implying the equality W(E) = CEρ/1000ρ by Eq. 1. 
 To test exchangeability as implied by uniformity, we first measured, for each 
source, the value a´  1/2 such that (a1/4, a´  1/2] ~ (a´  1/2, a3/4].  Exchangeability requires a´  1/2 = 
a1/2.  Next we measured a´´ 1/2  such that (−∞, a´´ 1/2 ] ~ (a´´ 1/2 , ∞), which is simply an exact 
replication of the measurement of a1/2 as done before.  It serves to test for consistency 
(a´´ 1/2  = a1/2).  The value a1/2 is important because the other measurements of events are 
derived from it, which is why we measured it extensively.  We measured preferences 
between bets on different intervals that should be indifferent under exchangeability: 
(−∞, a1/8] versus (a7/8, ∞] and (a1/8, a1/4] versus (a3/4, a7/8]. 
 
B. Results on Uniformity, Subjective Probability, and Utility 
Uniformity.  We use the term case to specify both the source of unknown probability 
(CAC40, Paris temperature, or foreign temperature) and the treatment (real incentives 
or hypothetical choice).  Thus there are six cases.  Since there were no irregularities in 
the answers that subjects supplied, we used the whole sample.  The third measurement 
of a1/2 (as midpoint of (−∞, ∞)) was identical to the first measurement, and served as a 
reliability test.  Pairwise t-tests never rejected the null hypothesis of equal values (for 
neither treatment nor for the whole group), and the correlations exceeded 0.85 for all 
three sources and both treatments.  These results suggest that the measurements were 
reliable. 
 The most refined level of partitioning for which we obtained observations 
concerned the eight-fold partition of the events Ei8, which we observed for i = 1, 2, 7, 
8.  The equivalences E18 ~ E
2
8 and E
7
8 ~ E
8
8 hold by definition.  Assuming transitivity of 
indifference, it suffices to verify the equivalence E28 ~ E
7
8 to obtain equivalence of all 
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Ei8 available.  For no case did a binomial test reject the null hypothesis of indifference 
between bets on E28 and E
7
8.  The choices between E
1
8 and E
8
8 serve as an extra test of 
uniformity joint with transitivity of indifference.  Again, a binomial test never rejected 
indifference. 
 We made no observations of the eight-fold partition {Ei8} between a1/4 and a3/4, 
but in this region we can test exchangeability (implied by uniformity) for the four-fold 
partition {Ei4}.  Given the equivalences E14 ~ E24 and E34 ~ E44 that hold by definition, and 
transitivity of indifference, it suffices to verify the indifference E24 ~ E
3
4.  Although we 
did not directly test choices between bets on E24 and E
3
4, our second measurement of 
a1/2, as midpoint of (a1/4, a3/4], entails a test of the equivalence E24 ~ E34.  The 
correlations between the first and second measurement of a1/2 exceeded 0.75 for all 
three sources and both treatments as well as the whole group, exceeding 0.90 in all 
but one case.  Pairwise t-tests never rejected the null hypothesis of equal values of a1/2 
(for neither treatment nor for the whole group) with one exception: For the 
hypothetical group and foreign temperature the difference was significant (t30 = 2.10, p 
= 0.04). 
 Another test of exchangeability can be derived from comparing the certainty 
equivalents of bets on events E12 to those on events E
2
2.  Under exchangeability, these 
should all be the same.  Pairwise t-tests never rejected the null hypothesis of equal 
values (for neither treatment nor for the whole group), with Pearson correlations of 
approximately 0.5 and more.  Hence these tests do not reject exchangeability. 
 The tests suggest that uniformity is least satisfied for foreign temperature with 
hypothetical choice, with no violations found for the other five cases.  Because the 
source method has been developed for uniform sources, we will report our analyses of 
risk and ambiguity attitudes only for the five remaining cases in what follows.  
 
Subjective Probabilities.  Figures 6 and 7 display median subjective probability 
estimations for the real and hypothetical treatments contrasted with historical 
frequencies.  The medians are always derived from the medians of the ai/j.  Figure 6 
displays the median subjective probability distribution functions for CAC40.  Both 
curves show that our subjects were optimistic in the sense that they considered 
increases of the index to be more probable than decreases.  The figure also displays 
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the observed frequency distribution over the year 2006.  Our subjects expected 
extreme, primarily positive, changes to be more likely than they actually were. 
 Figure 7 displays the median subjective distribution function for Paris 
temperature.  The historical distribution for the time considered (May 31, 1 PM) has 
been added too.  The curves are well calibrated.  Our subjects are apparently better 
acquainted with temperature volatility than with stock volatility.  The data also 
suggest that subjects did not expect higher temperatures than the historical 
distribution over the past century.  We do not report the subjective probabilities for 
foreign cities because the cities were different for different subjects so that this 
distribution did not concern the same random event for all subjects.  Although it was 
unlikely that the subjects, who were recruited individually, might know each other, 
we wanted to avoid any possibility of them learning anything about the city, which is 
why we changed it for each subject. 
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Utility.  The certainty equivalents (statistics not reported) suggest risk seeking for low 
probabilities and risk aversion for moderate and high probabilities, with more risk 
aversion for the real treatment than for the hypothetical treatment.  All these findings 
agree with common findings in the literature (Colin Camerer and Hogarth 1999; 
Gonzalez and Wu 1999), and are confirmed by the parametric estimations given in the 
Web Appendix.  Figure 8 displays the empirical distribution of the individual powers 
of utility.  The majority of powers is below 1, suggesting moderate concavity (61.2% 
for the hypothetical treatment and 72.4 % for the real treatment).  Median, mean, and 
standard deviations are 0.92, 1.01, and 0.59 for the hypothetical treatment and 0.75, 
0.85, and 0.56 for the real treatment.  The powers of utility were lower for the real-
incentive group than for the hypothetical group, but the difference was not significant.  
A lower power entails more concavity, which will generate more risk aversion (given 
a fixed weighting function), in agreement with the common findings in the literature 
of more risk aversion for real incentives. 
 
C. Overall results for Source Functions 
 This section reports results on source functions, describing the decision attitudes 
found.  It does so only for the five cases where uniformity is satisfied.  The following 
figure displays source functions.  Part (a) displays source functions obtained from the 
raw data and linear interpolation, and part (b) displays the best-fitting function from 
Prelec’s (1998) compound invariance family (Eq. 10).  The statistical results for 
0 
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1 
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FIGURE 8. Cumulative distribution of powers 
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Prelec’s parameters α and β were similar to those for a and b.  As with Experiment 1, 
we only report the latter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 The indexes a and b were calculated for each individual and each source.  The 
parameters displayed are calculated to fit the group averages, and will not be used in 
statistical analyses.  Their orderings agree with all qualitative findings made below.  
Note how Figure 9 compactly and completely presents all components of the decision 
attitude beyond Bayesian expected utility.  Together with the Bayesian components of 
utility and subjective probabilities, the figure completely captures the decision 
attitude, exactly quantified, for four sources at the same time.  This makes it possible 
to immediately and visually compare these non-Bayesian components.  In particular, 
by comparisons with the graphs for risk, the figure immediately reveals attitudes 
towards ambiguity. 
 The hypothetical-treatment curves (Figure A.13 in the Web Appendix) are similar 
to those of the real-payment treatment (Figure 9), but hypothetical choices were 
subject to more noise.  All curves display the common inverse-S shape of Fig 1d with 
low probabilities overweighted and high probabilities underweighted.  Most observed 
points wS(p) deviate significantly from linearity.  In other words, the null hypothesis 
of EU is usually rejected, except at p = 0.5, in agreement with inverse-S.  The 
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insensitivity parameter a was significantly higher for real incentives than for 
hypothetical choice for CAC40 and foreign temperature, and marginally so for Paris 
temperature (p = 0.053).  The pessimism parameter b was not different for the two 
treatments. 
 Regarding source functions under hypothetical payment, no significant 
differences are found between the source functions for different sources.  We 
therefore focus on real payment.  We first consider source functions wS(p) at single 
probabilities p.  With risk included, a repeated-measures analysis ANOVA (corrected 
by the Huynh-Feldt ε) finds significant source dependence for wS(p) and real payment 
except at p = 0.5.  Figure 9 shows that there is source preference (higher curve, so less 
pessimism) for risk over all other sources.  Indeed, paired t-tests for risk against each 
of the three sources indicate that the values wS(p) are significantly higher for risk than 
for foreign temperature at all probabilities (i.e., ambiguity aversion at all 
probabilities), for CAC40 at p = 0.125 and p > 0.50 and for Paris temperature at p > 0.5 
(i.e., ambiguity aversion for high probabilities).  If we exclude risk, then the ANOVA 
finds significant source dependence for p = 0.25.  The figure suggests source 
preference for Paris temperature over CAC40 and foreign temperature, and more 
pronounced inverse-S for CAC40 than for foreign temperature, but the differences 
between the curves at the various probabilities were not significant except for Paris 
against foreign temperature at p < 0.5. 
 We next consider tests of pessimism and likelihood insensitivity based on the 
global parameters a and b.  A repeated-measures ANOVA (corrected by the Huynh-
Feldt ε) reveals a clear source dependence of the pessimism index b.  The sensitivity 
parameter was not significantly different across sources at 5% once the Huynh-Feldt 
correction is applied. 
D. Results at the Individual Level for Source Functions 
 To illustrate that the source method can be used at the individual level, Figure 10 
displays the curves for the four sources of one individual, subject 2 from the real-
payment treatment.  This subject thought long and seriously about each question, and 
the interview took almost two hours.  He exhibits source preference for all sources 
over foreign temperature.  Further, risk is less likelihood insensitive than CAC40 and 
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Paris temperature.  In the raw data, the subject slightly violates monotonicity for 
CAC40, showing that there is noise in the data. 
 Behavioral implications are that the subject will be more prudent, invest less, and 
take out more insurance for foreign temperature events than for the other events.  The 
subject will be more open to long shots for Paris temperature and CAC40 than for risk 
but, on the other hand, will also rather insure for Paris temperature and CAC40 than 
for risk.  An updating of (subjective) probabilities after receipt of new information 
will affect the subject less for Paris temperature and CAC40 than for risk. 
 Figures 9 (for a representative agent) and 10 (for subject 2) concerned a within-
person comparison of different attitudes towards uncertainty for different sources, 
which we take as the main novelty initiated by the Ellsberg paradoxes.  We can also 
use source functions and the above indexes of pessimism and likelihood insensitivity 
for the—more traditional—between-person comparisons of uncertainty attitudes.  
Figure 11 displays some comparisons.  We selected four subjects with clearly distinct 
curves for the purpose of illustration.  All curves concern the same source, namely 
Paris temperature.  The lowest curve (subject 18) is more pessimistic than all other 
subjects.  This subject will buy more insurance, for instance.  The dark middle curve 
(subject 2) clearly displays more pronounced likelihood insensitivity than the dashed 
curve that is close to linear (subject 48).  Hence, simultaneous gambling and 
insurance is more likely to be found for subject 2 than for subject 48, and subject 2’s 
decisions will be influenced less by new information (updating probabilities) than 
those of subject 48 (c.f. Larry Epstein 2008). 
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 In general, there was more variation in the individual parameter estimates for the 
ambiguous sources than for risk.  It is not surprising, indeed, that risk is perceived 
more homogeneously across individuals than ambiguity.   
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 Figures 12 and 13 display scatter plots of the pessimism indexes and the 
sensitivity indexes, respectively, of the 29 subjects of the real payment group in each 
ambiguous source (y-axis) as a function of the pessimism indexes under risk (x-axis).  
The correlations between the pessimism index in each of the three ambiguous sources 
and the one under risk (the ρs in each graph) are positive and highly significant, as are 
the corresponding correlations between the sensitivity indexes.  Thus some subjects 
are likely to be more pessimistic (or more insensitive) for all sources than other 
subjects, showing that there is systematic between-subject heterogeneity.  Further, the 
subjects are significantly more pessimistic in each of the three ambiguous sources 
than under risk (paired t-tests), showing that there is systematic between-source 
heterogeneity.  The sensitivity indexes were not significantly different between the 
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different sources.  Similar scatter plots for the hypothetical choices and for the 
Ellsberg experiment of §3, with the same findings, are in the Web Appendix.  This 
Web Appendix also provides histograms of the shapes of individual source functions 
and of the number of subjects who are ambiguity averse or ambiguity seeking. 
E. Results Regarding Ambiguity 
 Ambiguity attitudes are usually taken to reflect the differences between sources 
with unknown probabilities and sources with known probabilities.  We can infer those 
differences from comparing the curves for risk with the other curves, in Figures 9 and 
10.  These comparisons have been discussed above, with the risk-curves typically 
dominating the other curves, confirming ambiguity aversion. 
F. Conclusions from Natural Experiment 
 In natural sources of uncertainty, uniformity is a nontrivial restriction.  We found 
it violated in one of the six cases considered.  Again, the source functions display 
natural properties, with more willingness to bet for risk than for the other sources 
when the choice-based probabilities exceed 0.5.  There is considerable variation not 
only between individuals but also within individuals between sources. 
 Behavioral implications of our findings are that people will be more prudent, 
invest less, and take out more insurance for unknown probabilities than for known 
probabilities, confirming ambiguity aversion.  As regards the three sources with 
unknown probabilities in the second experiment, people will be more open to both 
insurance and long shots, and will update less, for foreign temperature than for 
CAC40 and Paris temperature. 
V. Discussion 
We have analyzed decision attitudes using three components, namely utility of 
outcomes, choice-based probabilities for each source, and source functions.  We first 
discuss some details of the measurements of these components, and then other issues. 
 
Measuring utility.  Our utility measurements are valid for most of the existing models.  
In particular, they are not distorted by violations of expected utility, unlike traditional 
 30 
methods based on the latter theory.  In the absence of such distortions, we found 
utility to be close to linear, in agreement with claims by Matthew Rabin (2000), Frank 
Ramsey (1931 p. 176), and others. 
 
Testing uniformity.  For both experiments, there was no prior reason to expect 
violations of exchangeability (the implication of uniformity relevant here).  Unlike in 
the 3-color Ellsberg paradox (discussed later), our subjects will not perceive different 
mechanisms of uncertainty underlying the sources considered here.  Because 
uniformity is central to the source method, we nevertheless carried out several tests, 
and we chose to be on the safe side by rejecting the one case in the natural experiment 
in which one of the several tests gave a violation. 
 We have restricted attention to two outcomes so as to focus on the likelihood 
aspects of decision making.  We also restricted attention to single-interval events.  
More elaborate tests, for instance regarding unions of interval events and more 
general outcomes, are planned for future research.  Empirical violations of uniformity 
can then be expected that are not based on intrinsic non-uniformity, but on perceptual 
biases.  For example, convex unions of intervals may be underestimated relative to 
nonconvex unions because, in the terminology of Tversky and Derek Koehler (1994), 
the former may be perceived as implicit unions and the latter as explicit unions.  This 
point was tested and confirmed by Baillon (2008).  Similarly, events related to 
extreme values (such as E12) may be perceived differently than events related to 
intermediate values (such as E24 ∪ E34). 
 
Within-source uniformity versus between-source uniformity.  For the cases where 
uniformity was satisfied, our tests found that, given a source, the willingness to bet on 
an event (through its certainty equivalent) depended only on the subjective probability 
of the event and not on where within the source the event came from otherwise.  This 
implies a uniform degree of ambiguity throughout the source.  The violations of 
probabilistic sophistication occurred only for comparisons of willingness to bet 
between different sources, and not within them.  Such a phenomenon first occurred in 
Ellsberg’s (1961) examples.  We found the phenomenon also for natural events, and 
showed (Web Appendix) how it can accommodate the home bias.  The source method 
exploits within-source uniformity while allowing between-source heterogeneity. 
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Other measurements of decision weights in the literature.  A measurement of decision 
weights using proper scoring rules, generalizing the latter to binary RDU, appeared in 
Theo Offerman, Joep Sonnemans, Gijs van de Kuilen, and Wakker (2009).  They 
obtained decision weights under uncertainty as functions of decision weights under 
risk, where the latter need not be additive, unlike our choice-based probabilities, so 
that they comprise part of the (nonexpected-utility) uncertainty attitude.  Steffen 
Andersen, Glenn Harrison, John Fountain, and Elisabet Rutström (2009a) measured 
subjective beliefs using a global maximum likelihood fitting technique.  Here all 
decision components, utility, probability weighting, and subjective probabilities are 
fitted in one blow.  Such a technique is powerful but needs extensive data (hence, all 
subjects with the same characteristics were treated as one subject).  Andersen et al. 
(2009a) assumed global probabilistic sophistication, so that within-subject between-
source heterogeneity and ambiguity aversion as in Ellsberg’s paradoxes cannot be 
handled.  If their technique is generalized to allow for source dependence of 
probability weighting, then it provides a useful alternative to our method for 
measuring source functions and reckoning with ambiguity attitudes.   
 Abdellaoui, Frank Vossmann, and Weber (2005) also analyzed general decision 
weights under uncertainty as functions of decision weights under risk.  They used the 
term choice-based probability to refer to such functions that, again, did not have to be 
additive.  They quantified attitudes towards uncertainty and ambiguity but in a general 
and complex manner, inheriting the dimensionality of general nonadditive weighting 
functions (with the same cardinality as the powerset of the state space), so that they do 
not achieve the tractability and reduction of dimension of our source functions.  
Unlike Offerman et al. (2009), Abdellaoui et al. (2005) did not use proper scoring 
rules but carried out a full decision analysis to elicit the required values.  Enrico 
Diecidue, Wakker, and Marcel Zeelenberg (2007) similarly measured general 
weighting functions assuming linear utility. 
 Einhorn and Hogarth (1985) used transformations of judged probabilities to 
empirically investigate ambiguity attitudes.  Judged probabilities were obtained 
through introspection by the subjects so that their approach was not based on revealed 
preference or on a decision theory for source dependence.  Our study can be 
interpreted as providing a revealed-preference basis for Einhorn and Hogarth’s ideas. 
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Heterogeneity or noise?  Heterogeneity of risk and ambiguity attitudes between 
individuals has been widely documented (Ahn et al. 2009; Gilboa 2004; Yoram 
Halevy 2007), and our findings agree.  Heterogeneity between sources within one 
individual has received less attention as yet, usually being restricted to the known-
unknown probability dichotomy.  The many significant differences that we found 
between different sources, and the natural directions of these differences—confirming 
earlier findings by Tversky and Fox (1995) and others for uncertainty and of 
numerous studies for risk—show that this heterogeneity is not noise.  A maximum 
likelihood analysis with a choice error theory incorporated (see the Web Appendix) 
further supports this claim, giving the same results as the analysis reported here.   
 
Precursors.  Several studies compared more refined gradations of ambiguity than the 
dichotomous known versus unknown probabilities, and they can be considered 
precursors of the between-source heterogeneity that we have argued for.  Such studies 
include Baillon and Laure Cabantous (2009), Chew et al. (2008), Shawn Curley and 
Frank Yates (1989), Einhorn and Hogarth (1985), Halevy (2007), John Hey, Gianni 
Lotito, and Anna Maffioletti (2008), Ming Hsu, Meghana Bhatt, Ralph Adolphs, 
Daniel Tranel, and Camerer (2005), and Tversky and Fox (1995).   In the same spirit, 
Tversky and Kahneman (1981 p. 454) wrote: “The major qualitative properties of 
decision weights can be extended to cases in which the probabilities of outcomes are 
subjectively assessed rather than explicitly given.  In these situations, however, 
decision weights may also be affected by other characteristics of an event, such as 
ambiguity or vagueness.”  For these authors, subjective probabilities are derived from 
direct introspective judgments and are nonadditive, unlike those of the source method. 
Their method was called the two-stage model, was suggested by William Fellner 
(1961, p. 672), and was also discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992, p. 317).  It 
was analyzed further by Abdellaoui, Vossmann, and Weber (2005), Fox, Rogers, and 
Tversky (1996), Fox and Tversky (1998), Kilka and Weber (2001), Tversky and Fox 
(1995), and Wu and Gonzalez (1999). 
 
Cases where the source method cannot be applied.  The most well-known example of 
a nonuniform source is Ellsberg’s (1961) three-color urn.  This example can be 
remodeled as the intersections of events from two different uniform sources (Chew 
and Sagi 2008, Haluk Ergin and Faruk Gul 2009; Machina 2009b).  Machina (2009a) 
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introduced some paradoxes for rank-dependent utility.  These are also paradoxes for 
most other ambiguity models popular today (Baillon, L’Haridon, and Placido, 
forthcoming).  They, however, only concern prospects of three or more outcomes, and 
do not concern our domain of binary prospects.   
 
The term uniformity.  We chose Savage’s (1954) term uniform rather than 
exchangeable for two reasons.  First, uniformity is slightly more general than 
exchangeability when imposed on finite sources, not requiring all elementary events 
to be equally likely.  Hence, a different term than exchangeability had to be chosen.  
Second, the condition suggests a uniform ambiguity of the source where, once two 
events have been revealed equally likely, they become completely substitutable in 
every aspect relevant for choice.  It is immaterial what their precise location and 
configuration is relative to other events.8 
 
Source comparisons.  The Ellsberg paradoxes have mostly been interpreted as 
evidence showing that people are more averse to unknown probabilities than to 
known probabilities (ambiguity aversion).  Our paper contributes to a line of research 
that extends this interpretation: People behave differently towards different sources of 
uncertainty, also if none of these sources concern known probabilities (Chew et al. 
2008; Chew and Sagi 2008; Curley and Yates 1989; Camela Di Mauro and Anna 
Maffioletti 2002; Fox and Tversky 1998; Tversky and Fox 1995; Wu and Gonzalez 
1999).  An important example concerns the home bias (Web Appendix, Example 
A.1).  The phenomena that we observed in the data confirm descriptive theories of 
ambiguity put forward in the psychological literature (Einhorn and Hogarth 1985; 
Tversky and Fox 1995), with not only a role for ambiguity aversion but also for 
likelihood insensitivity. 
 
                                               
8
 There are some formal differences between our concept of uniformity and Chew and Sagi’s (2008) 
concept of homogeneity.  The main difference is that our sources are a special case of theirs in the 
sense that our sources always span the universal event so that we never use conditioning on subevents.  
We prefer to separate the static concept of uniformity from dynamic issues regarding conditioning.  
Chew and Sagi incorporated conditioning to handle Ellsberg’s 3-color example, but we prefer to model 
this example as an intersection of different sources. 
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 Ambiguity or different risk attitudes?—A terminological issue.  It could be argued 
that the difference between known and unknown probabilities that we found in our 
natural experiment does not reflect ambiguity, but that instead it simply reflects a 
difference in risk attitude between the sources.  It could then be argued in the same 
way, however, that the classical Ellsberg paradox does not reflect ambiguity either, 
but instead also reflects a difference in risk attitude between the known and the 
unknown urn.  This point is, in fact, terminological.  Risk attitude is defined as the 
attitude towards given probabilities, which is taken as one source.  Following 
Ellsberg, the literature has defined ambiguity as the difference between unknown and 
known probabilities.  We follow this terminology.  It implies that source functions 
reflect a general uncertainty attitude that, by definition, consist of the risk attitude 
component plus an ambiguity attitude component. 
 
Reducing complexity.  For general weighting functions, a weight has to be chosen for 
every event separately, the complexity of which becomes intractable for large state 
spaces Ω.9  Hey, Lotito, and Maffioletti (2008) found that theories with many 
parameters do not perform well descriptively.  The source method greatly simplifies 
the complexity of general weighting functions, reducing the number of parameters.  
We identify uniform sources and, for each such source, have to measure one more 
function, the source function, in addition to what is required for Bayesian analyses 
(utilities and probabilities).  This procedure is simple enough to be implementable for 
large state spaces, as we have demonstrated in the experiments. 
 
Predicting choices between multi-outcome prospects.  Under the rank-dependent 
models (Gilboa 1987; Schmeidler 1989) which include prospect theory (Tversky and 
Kahneman 1992), source functions as measured by the source method completely 
determine the choices between all prospects, including those with many outcomes.  
Under the maxmin and α maxmin multiple priors models, further data about multi-
outcome prospects is required to predict choices between other multi-outcome 
prospects.  
 
                                               
9
 The dimension of the set of weighting functions, (2||Ω|| − 2), grows exponentially. 
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Multistage recursive models of uncertainty.  Klibanoff, Marinacci, and Mukerji 
(2005), Robert Nau (2006), William Neilson (1993), and Kyoungwon Seo (2009) 
considered multistage setups with backward induction and a violation of the reduction 
of compound lotteries (the multiplication rule for conditional probability) assumed.  
With the events at each stage taken as a separate source, these authors assumed 
expected utility (and hence probabilistic sophistication) within each source.  It implies 
that different attitudes towards different sources, including ambiguity attitudes, should 
be captured by different utility functions.  The latter, in our interpretation, then are 
source-dependent utility functions.  This interpretation was explicitly used in a single-
stage based experiment by Chew et al. (2008) and Andersen et al. (2009b).  Ahn et al. 
(2009) found that the (“single-stage”) binary RDU fitted their data better than the 
multistage model. 
 Ergin and Gul (2009) generalized the above multi-stage approaches by allowing 
for probabilistic sophistication, rather than expected utility, in each stage, and in that 
sense are closer to our method.  They still committed to the same multi-stage 
arrangement of sources and the same dynamic decision principles as the above 
authors did.10  They used the term issue instead of Tversky's term source (that we 
used).  Halevy and Ozdenoren (2008) introduced a calibration technique for such 
models.  Chew and Sagi (2008) introduced small worlds that, apart from some formal 
differences, play a role similar to our sources. 
 
VI. Conclusion 
 We introduced the source method with source functions as a refined tool to 
quantitatively capture the full richness of ambiguity.  The source method exploits 
within-source uniformity while allowing between-source heterogeneity.  In two 
experiments, attitudes towards uncertainty and ambiguity depended not only on the 
person but also on the source of uncertainty.  These findings show that uncertainty is a 
rich domain that can yet be analyzed in a tractable manner. 
 
                                               
10
 This follows primarily from their Axiom 5b that, when restricted to empty events B2, amounts to the 
weak separability needed for backward induction. 
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